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We prove unconditional security for a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol based on distilling
pbits (twisted ebits) [1] from an arbitrary untrusted state that is claimed to contain distillable key.
Our main result is that we can verify security using only public communication – via parameter
estimation of the given untrusted state. The technique applies even to bound entangled states, thus
extending QKD to the regime where the available quantum channel has zero quantum capacity. We
also show how to convert our purification-based QKD schemes to prepare-measure schemes.
I. BACKGROUND, PROBLEM, AND RESULT
The most general quantum state (known to the users)
which provides a secure key after measurement is not the
maximally entangled state (also known as EPR pairs [2]
or ebits), but rather, the pbit (sometimes called “twisted
ebits”)[1]. Security of entanglement-puriﬁcation-based
Quantum Key Distribution (EPP-QKD) is based on the
ability of two separated parties to estimate error rates
of an untrusted shared state relative to ebits. Here, we
devise an analoguous error estimation scheme relative to
pbits, using only public classical communication. The
scheme applies to some “bound entangled” initial states
that are nonetheless suﬃciently close to pbits. (A state
is bound entangled if no ebits can be distilled from many
copies of it.) Consequently, there are channels that can-
not be used to send quantum information (zero quan-
tum capacity), but that can be used for QKD (nonzero
key capacity). Furthermore, in spirit similar to [3], we
provide a recipe for converting pbit-puriﬁcation-based
QKD (PPP-QKD) to their associated prepare-measure
schemes (P/M-QKD ). We will concentrate on the ver-
iﬁcation scheme of Lo, Chau, and Ardehali [4, 5] where
bit and phase error rates are estimated. We instead esti-
mate “twisted” bit and phase error rates. Our proof uses
classical random sampling theory, and the exponential
quantum deFinetti theorem [6].
We ﬁrst provide a pedagogical review on the essential
concepts of QKD in Sec. I A. Readers familiar with QKD
can skip the review. We then discuss the current problem
in Sec. I B followed by a precise statement of our results
in Sec. I C as well as related results in Sec. ID. The proof
of security is contained in Sec. II with the essence of it
being in Sec. IID. We follow this up by a discussion on
how to convert our protocol to a P/M-QKD scheme in
Sec. III and give an example of QKD using a binding-
entanglement-channel in Sec. IV where the error rate is
so high that quantum capacity vanishes. A couple of
observations in pbit-based QKD are made in Sec. V. We
conclude with a discussion of open problems in Sec. VI.
Proofs are detailed in the Appendix, and the theorems
are restated in the body of the paper.
A. Review of quantum key distribution (QKD)
In the quantum world, it is generally impossible to ex-
tract information about a quantum state without dis-
turbing it [7]. This principle enables unconditionally se-
cure key distribution that is impossible classically. Key
distribution is the task of establishing a key between two
parties, Alice and Bob. Informally, a key distribution
protocol is secure if the probability to establish a com-
promised key vanishes. (In the above statement, we have
allowed the key length to vary and when it is zero, the
protocol “aborts”. See also [8].) If a protocol (given some
stated resources) is secure against the most powerful ad-
versary (Eve) limited only by laws of physics, its security
is “unconditional.”
In QKD, Alice and Bob can use a quantum channel (from
Alice to Bob) and classical channels (in both directions).
These can be noisy and controlled by Eve. In additional,
Alice and Bob have local coins and in some cases, quan-
tum computers. These can be noisy but not controlled by
Eve. Finally, Alice and Bob share a small initial key. Us-
ing the quantum universal composability result [9], most
of the imperfect resources can be made near-perfect while
preserving security – the classical channels and local re-
sources can be made reliable and authenticated using
the initial key and coding. We make these simplifying
assumptions from now on, and focus on imperfections
in the quantum channel. (As a side remark, for arbi-
trary adversarial imperfections in the quantum channel,
no coding method can convert it to a perfect quantum
channel. Fortunately, QKD requires less (see above) and
this paper revolves around the minimal requirement on
the quantum channel.)
We ﬁrst give the intuition behind the security oﬀered
by quantum mechanics assuming a noiseless quantum
channel. Alice and Bob pre-agree on a set of non-
orthogonal quantum states, each may be transmitted by
Alice through the quantum channel with some probabil-
ities. (This is the case in the earliest QKD scheme called
BB84 [10].) Eve can intercept and compromise the quan-
tum signals but they will be disturbed. Bob tells Alice
when he receives the states, and they subsequently detect
2disturbance using some of the states, and if they observe
none, they extract a key from the rest of the states; oth-
erwise, they abort the protocol.
QKD based on noisy channels is important for two rea-
sons. First, natural noise is inevitable and can be used by
an eavesdropper as a disguise. Second, it is desirable to
be able to generate a key despite some malicious attack.
Initial work [11, 12] was done based on error estimation,
privacy ampliﬁcation [13], and error correction. Mayers
ﬁrst gave an unconditional security proof for QKD [14],
showing that BB84 can provide a key up to ≈ 8% ob-
served error.
Later on, Lo and Chau [4] reported a security proof for a
diﬀerent QKD scheme based on E91 [15] – Alice and Bob
ﬁrst share some noisy, untrusted state ?ρ. It is supposed
to be n copies of |Φd〉 := 1√d
∑d
i=1 |i〉A|i〉B where {|i〉}
is a computational basis for the local systems A and B
possessed by Alice and Bob respectively. |Φd〉 is called
a “maximally entangled state” or MES for short. When
d = 2 it is also called an EPR pair or “ebit”. ?ρ arises
from Alice preparing n local copies of |Φd〉 and trans-
mitting Bob’s shares through an untrusted channel of d
dimensions. Eve can attack on all n systems jointly. We
focus on the d = 2 case (just like [4]). After Bob receives
the state, Alice and Bob extract a smaller number m
of nearly perfect ebits, from which a key is obtained by
measuring in the local computational basis. It is possible
for m = 0, when QKD is aborted. The Lo-Chau proof
is simple – however the noise arises, just detect and re-
move it, and doing so only involves standard techniques
in entanglement puriﬁcation (EPP) or distillation [16].
The disadvantage of the Lo-Chau proof is that, its as-
sociated scheme requires quantum storage and coherent
manipulation of quantum data, neither of which is re-
quired in BB84. Shor and Preskill [3] provided a recipe
to relate BB84 to the E91-Lo-Chau scheme, such that
the security of the former is implied by that of the lat-
ter. Furthermore, [3] generalizes to many other variants
of BB84 (collectively called “prepare-measure” scheme
P/M-QKD ) so that their security can be proved via that
of a related puriﬁcation-based QKD scheme.
B. Step-by-step QKD and motivation of current
problem
We discuss useful general concepts by interpreting the
Lo-Chau scheme [4] as follows. Alice and Bob preagree
on a set of parameters e for states, and let sets of states
sharing the same parameters be labeled as Se. (It will be
clear later how they should be chosen.) The protocol is
a 4-step process for Alice and Bob:
(1) Distribute an untrusted bipartite state ?ρ using the
untrusted resources.
(2) Perform tests (via public discussion) on ?ρ such that
if ?ρ ∈ Se, the test will output e with high probability.
They only need to know which e (or Se) but not which
?ρ, and the remaining procedure depends only on e and
applies to all states in Se. For example, in the Lo-Chau
scheme, e consists of two error rates (bit and phase), Se
is the set of states arising from inﬂicting errors of rates
e to the Bell states (see Def. 1 and Eq. (3) for a precise
deﬁnition).
(3) Based on the parameter e, apply an appropriate EPP
to ?ρ and output a state γ˜.
This procedure, if applied to any state in Se, will return
a good approximation of a known and trusted state γ
(e.g. ebits in E91/Lo-Chau).
(4) Generate a key by measuring γ˜ locally.
The key can have varying size (depends on e), and zero
key-length means “abort QKD.”
We will refer to these 4 steps (and their variations) re-
peatedly throughout the paper.
To generalize the Lo-Chau scheme, we examine the re-
quirements for each of these steps (in reverse order).
We start with step (4): Simply suppose Alice and
Bob share a known and trusted state γ. What γ
(other than |Φd〉) will generate a secure key? Ref-
erence [1] characterizes all such γ (up to local unitaries
on A and B):




|ij〉〈ij|AB ⊗ UijA′B′ (2)
where Φd = |Φd〉〈Φd| is the MES of local dimension d,
the subscripts AA′ and BB′ denote systems held by Al-
ice and Bob, Uij are unitary so that U is also unitary,
and ρA′B′ is any state (pure or mixed) of some arbitrary
dimension d′. (Note that dim(γUd ) = d
2d′ and the key
generated has size log d.) U in Eq. (2) is called the twist-
ing operator, and any γUd given by Eq. (1) is called a pdit
(or private state, or twisted state or gamma state). In
some sense, Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) characterize all noise on
an MES that is harmless for generating a key. We state
this property for the twisting operator U more precisely.
Observation 1 (See [1, 17]) Let U be any twisting op-
erator, and consider any two states ρAA′BB′ , σAA′BB′
related by σAA′BB′ = UρAA′BB′U
†. Let both be purified
by E. (See definition in Sec. II B right before Eq. (4).)
Then, if Alice and Bob measure A and B in the com-
putational basis, the reduced states on ABE, ρ˜ABE and
σ˜ABE, are the same.
Such postmeasurement states are called ccq states, for
Alice and Bob hold classical systems, while Eve’s state
remains unmeasured and quantum.
Now consider step (3): Which states can be con-
verted into a good approximation of a private
state (γ)? We call such states “key distillable” (even
though they are not of tensor power form). The con-
version procedure has to work for all states in Se. A
3complete characterization is unlikely to be tractable and
we only have examples. The canonical example in [4] is
the set of states with suﬃciently low error rates relative
to perfect ebits. We will call these “ǫ-good-ebits”. These
are not necessarily tensor power or product states (see
Def. 1 and Eq. (3)). Here, EPP works for all ǫ-good-ebits
independent of which one is the initial state. Another ex-
ample are tensor power states σ⊗n. In this case, one says
that a protocol achieves a “key rate” r if it converts σ⊗n
to ≈ γU2nr for some U given by Eq. (2), allowing n to be
asymptotically large. For example, protocols and lower
bounds for r are found in [18] for general σ.
We mention some surprising facts about private states
and key-distillable states. All perfect pdits (γ) contain
some distillable entanglement. However, some private
state has very little distillable entanglement but it can
still generate a big key. Also, some states can be made
arbitrarily close to private states and can have distillable
key (lower bound from [18]) but no distillable entangle-
ment (upper bound from showing the positivity of the
partial tranpose (PPT) [19, 20]).
We now arrive at the main concern of this paper: In
step (2), what sets Se contain key distillable states
and admit parameter estimation? What are the
corresponding tests for finding if ?ρ ∈ Se? In the
Lo-Chau proof, γ are ebits and Se can be chosen to be
ǫ-good-ebits (these are states with bounded error relative
to ebits, see Def. 1 and Eq. (3)). In the most general case,
γ is a pdit and a natural question is, can all key-distillable
Se be tested?
We believe that the above question is hard, by consid-
ering all possible “ǫ-good-pbits” – states obtained from
applying any twisting operation to ǫ-good-ebits, where
the twisting can act jointly on the entire system. With-
out further restriction on the joint twisting operation, it
is unclear how to perform parameter estimation on the
joint state.
One particularly useful class of ǫ-good-pbits are those
obtained from applying tensor-power twisting U⊗n on
ǫ-good-ebits. We will call these states ⊗-twist-ǫ-good-
pbits (note that just like ǫ-good-ebits, ⊗-twist-ǫ-good-
pbits need not be tensor power states). (See also Def.
2.)
Prior to this work, Ref. [21] showed how to perform
parameter estimation for Se containing ⊗-twist-ǫ-good-
pbits that have some distillable entanglement. There, the
important distinction from the Lo-Chau scheme is that,
in Ref. [21], entanglement is only distilled for parameter
estimation but not for the subsequent key generation. In
particular, the entanglement distilled in the scheme of
Ref. [21] can be in negligible quantity compared to the
key size. But [21] leaves many questions unanswered, in
particular, whether Se can contain bound entangled but
key distillable states, and whether distilling entanglement
(albeit a little) is necessary. Also, the test in [21] pre-
vents easy conversion to a simpler class of schemes called
prepare-measure schemes (P/M-QKD, see below).
In this paper, we will show that parameter estimation is
possible for all Se containing states which can be con-
verted into ⊗-twist-ǫ-good-pbits by LOCC operations
(involving only local operations and public classical com-
munications). Furthermore, this new estimation proce-
dure does not involve distillation so that it applies to
bound entangled states; it only involves product observ-
ables (see Def. 3), allowing easy conversion to P/M-QKD,
as we will see later.
C. Statement of results
In this paper, we report a new test procedure in step (2)
for any Se containing ⊗-twist-ǫ-good-pbits. Since Alice
and Bob can use LOCC in QKD, our procedure also ap-
plies to any Se containing states which can be converted
into ⊗-twist-ǫ-good-pbits by LOCC. In particular, these
include (1) ⊗-twist-ǫ-good-pbits themselves, and (2) ten-
sor power key distillable states. This new method does
not require distilling entanglement and it applies inde-
pendent of whether Se has distillable entanglement or is
bound entangled.
The protocol in this paper is similar to that in [21], and is
a “twist” from the original Lo-Chau scheme. In the crit-
ical step of phase error estimation, we test for “twisted
phase errors” (phase errors in the basis deﬁned by the
twisting operation) just as in [21]. In [21], it is based on
entanglement distillation and teleportation. Here, our
new procedure uses a new ﬁnite quantum deFinetti the-
orem with exponential convergence [6] and requires only
local resources, measuring product observables (Def. 3),
and classical communication. This has signiﬁcant conse-
quences:
(1) There are quantum channels that have zero quantum
capacity but nonzero key capacity. Each set of states Se
captures what Alice and Bob expect ?ρ to be. It summa-
rizes deviations (from perfect pbits) that can be removed
by LOCC. Such deviations including channel noise and
some noise inﬂicted by eavesdropping. For example, Se
can be based on prior knowledge of a quantum channel
available to Alice and Bob, but the channel is susceptible
to attack by an eavesdropper. Our work extends QKD
to the regime when the available quantum channel allows
sharing of a bound entangled key distillable state when
uncorrupted, while this channel cannot even transmit any
quantum data. (In the static case, there are untrusted
and bound entangled states that can give a secure key.)
(2) Prepare-measure scheme based on private states. Re-
markably, in the noiseless case, E91 is mathematically
related to many “prepare-measure” QKD schemes (P/M-
QKD) including BB84. P/M-QKD only requires quan-
tum states to be prepared and be sent by Alice, and
be measured by Bob without being stored, thus, min-
imal coherent quantum manipulations. P/M-QKD has
4much practical advantage over distillation or puriﬁca-
tion based schemes, but the latter often have simple un-
conditional security proofs. Shor and Preskill [3] illus-
trated mathematical connections between the two types
of schemes even in the noisy case for some EPP (and
rederived Mayer’s proof for BB84 from the Lo-Chau se-
curity proof). Reference [22] generalized the connection
to more general EPP. Likewise, our new test procedure
allows the puriﬁcation-based scheme to be transformed
to a P/M-QKD. This can be useful in implementation.
D. Related work
As already noted, this paper is a follow-up of [21] on pa-
rameter estimation of untrusted states relative to pbits.
The scheme in [21] requires a small amount of distillable
entanglement – it does not apply to bound entangled
states and thus cannot be used on states generated by a
channel with zero quantum capacity.
An earlier version of the current result used an exact but
polynomial quantum deFinetti theorem [23] from which
we obtained a much lower key rate. The new exponential
approximate quantum deFinetti theorem (exp-QDFT) in
[6] provides much better bounds and properties.
There are two intuitive solutions to the current problem
of parameter estimation. The ﬁrst is a state-tomographic
estimation, which was suggested in [1], but the accu-
racy and security was not analyzed. It is interesting
to note here that exp-QDFT provides exactly the tool
for doing so. Whatever ?ρ is, Alice and Bob can sim-
ply choose half of the systems (or any linear amount) at
random, and the resulting state ?ρ′ is exponentially close
to a mixture of “almost-power-state.” Se can be cho-
sen to be tensor powers of key distillable states and the
test for ?ρ′ ∈ Se simply involves state tomography using
only measurement of product observables and classical
communication. This paper follows another intuitive ap-
proach – error estimation in in the twisted basis, via a
decomposition of the twisted observable into product ob-
servables (see Def. 3). Intriguingly, a natural choice of
the set of product observables is also tomographically
complete. However, discarding is not necessary here.
The main challenge is a rigorous security proof, along
with a careful analysis of how various parameters are re-
lated. We have used many diﬀerent elements (including
the exp-QDFT) in [6], along with earlier techniques such
as quantum-classical-reduction and various random sam-
pling techniques, [4, 5], and also ideas from [21].
In this paper, we have also emphasized various useful
concepts, such as “harmless errors” and the structural
constituents of QKD. Examples of harmless errors (most
generally deﬁned by the private states) was observed in
earlier works by Aschauer and Briegel [24] and was used
in [25, 26, 27] to improve the key rate. Various useful
structural descriptions of QKD, revolving more around
P/M-QKD, have also been proposed before [5, 6, 28].
After the initial presentation of this result [29], and dur-
ing the preparation of the current manuscript, Renes and
Smith [30] independently reported the following related
result. The P/M-QKD scheme [26, 31] that uses local
noise inﬂicted by Alice to increase the key rate has an in-
terpretation as a QKD scheme based on distributing and
distilling a particular private/twisted state. Thus they
arrived at an (existing) example of P/M-QKD based on
private states (but the state has to be (ebit) distillable
since the noise is local). This is complementary to our
current result (2) that aims at a general recipe to convert
distillation based scheme to P/M-QKD.
II. DETAIL OF OUR RESULT
Recall that in the current formulation of QKD, the goal
is to accurately test whether the shared bipartite state ?ρ
is in some Se or not, and if so, apply a transformation
that will bring any state in that Se to a state close to
a private state γ. The test and transformation use only
LOCC. Note that ?ρ is determined by eavesdropping and
the channel properties, while Se and the test is part of
the design of the QKD scheme. We will describe and
prove the security of a QKD scheme with Se containing
⊗-twist-ǫ-good-pbits (see Def. 2).
As described before, our procedure also applies to any Se
containing states which can be converted into ⊗-twist-ǫ-
good-pbits by LOCC, by prepending such transformation
to our scheme. As an example, Se may contain tensor
power of key distillable states σ⊗n for arbitrarily large n.
Since σ is key distillable, ∃k such that σ⊗k can be prepro-
cessed by Lk (via LOCC) to a state σ˜k that approximates
some private state to some predetermined accuracy (the
dimension of the key part is then 2kr for some r > 0).
To test if ?ρ ∈ Se (i.e., whether ?ρ = σ⊗n), Alice and Bob
can ﬁrst apply the preprocessing L⊗⌊n/k⌋k to ?ρ, followed
by our estimation procedure for S˜e containing σ˜
⊗⌊n/k⌋
k ,
which is a ⊗-twist-ǫ-good-pbit. Clearly if ?ρ ∈ Se, the
above test will pass with high probability. There are
several subtle points concerning this reduction: (1) The
key-rate can be suboptimal. (2) The preprocessing may
prevent the QKD scheme from being easily converted to
P/M-QKD schemes. (3) The dimension of the new key
part, 2kr, is ﬁnite but can be large for ﬁnite preprocess-
ing precision, and the accuracy of our test has a strong
dimensional dependence.
We will also return to one other observation in Sec. V,
that for a given state, it can be related to many diﬀerent
pbits (deﬁned by diﬀerent twisting operations). Conse-
quently, the error rate of a state relative to each pbit
and thus the key rate depend on the choice of the pbit
being considered, and should be optimized. For now, we
consider an arbitrary choice, such as one arising from
the knowledge of the available channel. We will describe
5methods for the optimization later.
Both [21] and this paper exploit the relation between
ǫ-good-ebits and ǫ-good-pbits – they diﬀer only by a
change of basis (in particular, for ⊗-twist-ǫ-good-pbits,
the change is simply given by the tensor power of the
single-system twisting operation Eq. (2)). That the twist-
ing is not an LOCC operation, of course, changes all the
nonlocal resource accounting. But surprisingly, as we will
see, a variation of the Lo-Chau scheme is invariant un-
der twisting, except for one step. So, we detail how and
why the Lo-Chau scheme works, and explain how that
exceptional step can be circumvened.
A. Concepts in tolerable attacks
Core to the analysis of QKD using noisy resources is a
notion of tolerable adversarial attacks, which are quan-
tiﬁed by the parameters to be estimated. (For example,
these are chosen to be the number of bit-ﬂip and phase-
ﬂip errors in the transmitted qubits in many schemes.)
We make this notion precise in the following, and de-
velop notations used throughout the paper. Consider an
n-qubit system. Let e be the Pauli group acting on it
(parameter n omitted). For each P ∈ e, up to a scalar
factor in {±1,±i}, P = σx1x σz1z ⊗ σx2x σz2z ⊗ · · ·σxnx σznz
where σx,z are the generators for the qubit Pauli group,
and xi, zi ∈ {0, 1} are matrix exponents. It will be-
come clear that the scalar factor is irrelevant in our
work, thus each P is represented by the two n-bit strings
x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) and z = (z1, z2, · · · , zn), which we
will call the “X- and Z-components” of P . The number
of 1’s in a bitstring is called its Hamming weight. Col-
lect all P ’s in e that have X and Z-components with
Hamming weights no greater than nǫx and nǫz into a set
eǫ where ǫ = (ǫx, ǫz) represents two error rates critical
in the security of QKD. Finally, denote the linear span
of eǫ (over C) by seǫ. The eavesdropping attack of cur-
rent interest, described as a trace-preserving completely-












kEk = I holds. Note that
when ǫx, ǫz reach their maximum, seǫ is the set of all
bounded operators, thus, any eavesdropping attack is of
the form Eq. (3) for suﬃciently large ǫx, ǫz.
For the case of qubit transmission, we omit the d = 2 in
the notation for the maximally entangled state |Φd〉 and
Φd. Using Eq. (3), we make the important deﬁnition:
Definition 1 (ǫ-good-ebit) We call the state Pǫ(Φ⊗n)
“n ǫ-good-ebits”, where Pǫ acts on the n qubits of Bob
and the identity map acts on the n qubits of Alice.
Note that ǫ-good-ebits are not necessarily tensor power
states. We will also use the analogue in a twisted basis:
Definition 2 (⊗-twist-ǫ-good-pbit) We call the state
U⊗n[Pǫ(Φ⊗n) ⊗ ρanc]U †⊗n “n ⊗-twist-ǫ-good-pbits”,
where U is a twisting operator given by Eq. (2), and the
ancillary state ρanc can be arbitrary over all the anciliary
systems (A′B′)⊗n.
B. The Lo-Chau scheme
The Lo-Chau scheme focuses on the d = 2 case. Alice
uses the channel n times to send Bob’s halves of n ebits
she prepared locally. In the absence of Eve, ?ρ shared after
step (1) should diﬀer from Φ⊗n by the channel noise. It
thus makes sense to use ǫ = (ǫx, ǫz) as the parameter e in
Se, and deﬁne Sǫ to be the set of all n ǫ-good-ebits. Here,
ǫx, ǫz are called the bit and phase error rates respectively.
When eavesdropping is possible, Alice and Bob need to
determine ǫ for which ?ρ ∈ Sǫ with high probability. In
security proofs, we do not lose security if we assume less.
So, we let ?ρ be completely unconstrained and allow Eve
to possess the puriﬁcation of ?ρ. (A purifcation of a mixed
state ρ on a system S1 is a pure state on two systems
S1, S2 such that tracing out the extra system S2 will
give ρ. The purifying system S2 contains all information
related to S1 outside of it.) Since {P |Φ〉⊗nAB}P∈e is a





αP (P |Φ〉⊗nAB)⊗ |eP 〉E . (4)
Here, P ranges over all possible n-qubit Pauli operators
in e, αP are arbitrary amplitudes, and |eP 〉E are normal-
ized states on system E.
Step (2) in the Lo-Chau scheme is carried out by es-
timating the error rates ǫx, ǫz by random sampling of
the AB-systems without replacement. To estimate ǫx, m
systems are chosen randomly and σz⊗σz is measured on
each of them, and the estimated ǫx is the number of −1
outcomes divided by m. (Note that the outcome of mea-
suring σz ⊗ σz on an ebit should be +(−)1 when there
is zero(one) σx error). In other words, one measures λ,
the eigenvalue of
∑m
i=1(σz⊗σz)(i)AB where (i) denotes the
ith sampled system, and estimate ǫx to be
1
2 (1 − λm ).
(Similarly for ǫz.) We will next describe the estimation
process in two ways, a simple abstraction and the actual
implementation, and we show that they are equivalent.






µP,ǫ|ǫ〉O ⊗ |eP 〉E (5)
where the experimental estimate of the error rates of the
QKD execution, |ǫ〉 = |ǫx, ǫz〉, is in the system O avail-
able to all three parties. In a good estimation procedure,
6the estimated error rates should not deviate signiﬁcantly
from the actual values, except with very small probabil-
ity. Let nǫxP , nǫzP be the Hamming weights of the X-
and Z-components of P . A good estimation translates to
the mathematical statement that, for each ǫxP , ǫzP , the
sum of |µP,ǫ|2 over ǫ should be small whenever |ǫxP − ǫx|
or |ǫzP − ǫz| is signiﬁcant. Reference [5] provides a test
procedure for the Lo-Chau scheme that achieves the fol-
lowing: For small δ and m < ( 2δ
2
1+2δ2 )n, we have
Pr( |ǫxP−ǫx| ≥ δ) ≤ f(m, δ) (6)
where f(m, δ) = 2 exp
(−2mδ2) with natural exp rather
than base 2, so that |µP,ǫx,ǫz |2 ≤ 2f(m, δ) if max(|ǫx −
ǫxP |, |ǫz − ǫzP |) ≥ δ. To achieve good estimation is a
central aspect of QKD. The proof in [5] is subtle – mea-
surement of P commutes with measurement of ǫ so that
whether the former is done cannot change the distribu-
tion of the latter. So, we can assume measurement of
P has been done here. Most importantly, such assump-
tion applies even to actual indirect measurements of ǫ
that may not commute with measurement of P , as long
as the indirect measurement gives accurate results, and
all intermediate results (except the ﬁnal outcome) are
discarded (see argument to follow). This imagined mea-
surement of P turns both P and ǫ into classical random
variables and classical random sampling theory can then
be applied.
In real experiments, there are two diﬀerences from the
abstraction. First, the intended measurement operators
σx ⊗ σx and σz ⊗ σz are nonlocal (i.e., they are parity
measurements in the conjugate and computational bases)
but they are implemented via local measurements, for ex-
ample, the eigenvalue of σx⊗σx is obtained by measuring
that of σx⊗ I and I ⊗ σx on the properly paired AB sys-
tems and taking the product of the two outcomes (±1).
Second, the 2m random samples will be irreversibly mea-
sured out. We want to replace the analysis of the real ex-
periments by that of the abstraction, and we now show
that such replacement is valid if we impose certain con-
ditions on the protocol, as detailed in the following ob-
servation:
Observation 2 If Alice and Bob perform (1) local (de-
molition) measurements, (2) classical communication of
the outcomes, (3) classical postprocessing and output a
function of the outcomes, (4) discard all measured sys-
tems, all intermediate outcomes and communicated mes-
sages, then the procedure is equivalent to a direct mea-
surement yielding the function (and nothing else) and
discarding the measured system.
Proof: Local measurements can be made “coherently”
so that the outcome is stored in the computation basis
of an ancilla without being read. Classical communica-
tion from Alice to Bob can be modeled as the isometry
|x〉A → |x〉A|x〉B |x〉E where Eve’s copy ensures classi-
cality and generality of the security argument. Similarly
for classical communication from Bob to Alice. Then,
Alice and Bob each performs the classical postprocess-
ing (locally) to derive the same intended measurement
outcome. Besides this, they discard everything else, i.e.
they give to Eve all measured systems, their copies of
the coherent classical communication, and the workspace
of the classical-post-processing, and Eve can reconstruct
the postmeasurement state. The entire procedure is thus
equivalent to the desired direct measurement.
Keep in mind not to use the 2m samples again, we can
analyze the state in Eq. (5) in the abstract setting. This





αP µP,ǫ (P |Φ〉⊗nAB) |ǫ〉O ⊗ |eP 〉E + |Ψbad〉 (7)
where the primed sum of ǫ is now restricted to those
terms in which ǫx, ǫz are δ close to ǫxP , ǫzP respec-
tively, and the unnormalized |Ψbad〉 contains all other
terms with bad estimates. The important point is
that |Ψbad〉 has norm squared bounded by 2f(m, δ).










P |αP |22f(m, δ) ≤ 2f(m, δ)). We include this bad
term in our equations to keep track of the entire picture
but we need not worry about its evolution.
In step (3), based on the estimates ǫx, ǫz, Alice and Bob
run any applicable EPP (e.g. see [16, 22]) on the unmea-







βg |Φ〉⊗(n−2m)rǫAB |gǫ〉+ βb |bǫ〉
) |ǫ〉O|eP 〉E
+|Ψbad〉
To obtain the above expression, note that the output
of EPP depends on P , ǫ, and random inputs of EPP.
Taking a coherent description for the local coins, and fo-
cusing on one (P, ǫ)-term in the primed sum where error
estimate is accurate, EPP produces an output with high
ﬁdelity with respect to |Φ〉⊗(n−2m)rǫAB where rǫ is the en-
tanglement rate depending mostly on ǫ (and slightly on
n−2m for ﬁnite eﬀect, and ﬁnally, negligibly on the lo-
cal coins because this eﬀect can be removed by lowering
the rate slightly). We collect the rest of the system into
a suﬃciently large auxiliary space. Uhlmann’s theorem
[32] guarantees an output state for the (P ,ǫ)-term in the
form inside the parenthesis: the auxiliary output states
|gǫ〉 and the bad EPP term |bǫ〉 are orthonormal, with




b = 1 and βb upper bounded by an ex-
ponential function in n [3, 16, 22, 33]. If ǫx, ǫz are too
high, rǫ = 0 and implicitly QKD is aborted (yet preserv-
ing security). The incoherence between the diﬀerent P, ǫ
terms can be absorbed into the auxiliary system. In real
experiments, EPP is done incoherently, but as long as Al-
ice and Bob refrain from using anything other than the
ﬁnal output (i.e. discarding everything else) the abstract
picture will hold.
7Finally, Alice and Bob measure out a key from the
(AB)⊗(n−2m)rǫ systems, which has high ﬁdelity to ebits
(when conditioning on other systems is NOT made).
This guarantees security [8] in the universal compos-
able deﬁnition [8, 9]. In particular, let the ideal state
be |ψideal〉 =
∑
P,ǫ αP µP,ǫ |Φ〉⊗nAB|gǫ〉|ǫ〉O ⊗ |eP 〉E , and
the output in the last equation be |ψactual〉. Then, the





4f(δ,m) + β2b (because|〈ψideal|ψactual〉| ≥ (1 − 2f(δ,m))βg). Roughly speaking,
it means that if an ideal key used in any application is
replaced by the one generated in the QKD protocol, no
attack involving all parts of the application can achieve
a statistical diﬀerence better than the stated insecurity
parameter.
We end this section with a deﬁnition for a useful concept
we came across:
Definition 3 (Product vs nonproduct observables)
A product observable (with respect to systems S1, S2)
is one of the form OS1 ⊗ OS2. While nonlocal, it can
be measured using LOCC: perform the individual local
measurements OS1 ⊗ IS2, IS1 ⊗ OS2, exchange the
classical outcomes, and calculate the product.
C. Replacing EPP by EC/PA
In [3, 22], classes of entanglement puriﬁcation protocols
(EPP) were found to have a very nice property when used
in EPP-QKD. If Alice and Bob apply EPP followed by
ﬁnal measurements in the computation basis to extract a
key, their many steps can be rearranged without chang-
ing the security of the ﬁnal key. In particular, the rear-
ranged protocol has the computation-basis measurement
done ﬁrst, generating what is called a “sifted-raw-key”
(the adjective “sifted” is only useful later in the mapping
to P/M-QKD). The steps of the original EPP become
(classical) error correction (EC) on the sifted-raw-key fol-
lowed by privacy ampliﬁcation (PA) to generate the ﬁnal
key. Such EPP include 1-EPP protocols corresponding
to CSS codes (i.e. involving only parity checks entirely in
the computation basis, or entirely in the conjugate basis),
and also 2-EPP protocols that are CSS like, symmetric
with respect to exchanging Alice and Bob, and adapting,
only to the parity checks in the computation basis. We
will call such schemes EC/PA-Lo-Chau schemes, which,
from now on, are always being considered in place of the
original Lo-Chau scheme.
References [3, 5, 22] provide recipes to convert EPP-QKD
to the simpler P/M-QKD. We will ﬁrst describe a pbit-
distillation based QKD scheme (PPP-QKD) and provide
a security proof in the next section. In Sec. III, we outline
a conversion to P/M-QKD for our PPP-QKD scheme.
D. QKD based on ⊗-twist-ǫ-good-pbits
We ﬁrst consider the d = 2 case in direct correspon-
dence with the EC/PA-Lo-Chau scheme, again omitting
the d = 2 notations in γUd and |Φd〉.
After step (1), Alice and Bob are sharing untrusted state
?ρ, and in step (2) Alice and Bob want to test if ∃Sǫ such
that ?ρ ∈ Sǫ, where
Sǫ = {U⊗n(Pǫ(Φ⊗nAB)⊗ ρanc U †⊗n} (8)
is a set of ⊗-twist-ǫ-good-pbits (see Def. 2) and ρanc is
an arbitrary anciliary state on (A′B′)⊗n.
Consider the following unfeasible scheme: ﬁrst untwist,
i.e., apply U⊗n† to ?ρ, then apply the EC/PA-Lo-Chau
scheme. This is equivalent to running the EC/PA-Lo-
Chau scheme in the case of Sǫ = {Pǫ(Φ⊗nAB)} and thus
it is secure. The problem is that untwisting is global
and requires resources unavailable in real-life QKD. Our
strategy is to write down (mathematically) this secure
but unfeasible scheme as a ﬁrst step. Then, we explain
security-preserving modiﬁcations that make the scheme
feasible using the usual resources allowed in QKD. In
short, this is possible because only one step in EC/PA-
Lo-Chau scheme is aﬀected by the twisting and untwist-
ing operations (see also [21]). The exceptional step is
the estimation of ǫz in the twisted basis. In [21], it was
handled by ﬁrst distilling some ebits followed by telepor-
tation of a small number of test system to enable untwist-
ing. Here, it will be handled without distilling ebits.
In detail, this secure but unfeasible protocol runs as fol-
lows:
(2) Apply untwisting U⊗n† to ?ρ, then estimate ǫx and ǫz
on the (AB)⊗n systems (by using mx and mz samples
respectively), and ﬁnally reapply U⊗n.
(3’) Apply untwisting U⊗n†, measure out a sifted-raw-
key in the n−mx−mz systems.
(4’) Perform error correction and privacy ampliﬁcation
on the sifted-raw-key via 1- or 2-way public discussion.
We now explain how to transform the above protocol to
one involving only measurements of product observables
and classical communication, and in particular, without
distillation of ebits. In step (2), only a random subset of
mx+mz systems are measured. On the other n−mx−mz
untested systems, the untwisting and twisting cancel out
(thus can be omitted). On the tested systems, for the
estimate of ǫz, untwisting, measuring
∑mz
i=1(σx ⊗ σx)(i)AB
and twisting (where i is a label of the tested sample)





where Γx = UABA′B′(σx⊗σx⊗ IA′B′)U †ABA′B′ . Here, Γx
is a nonproduct observable (see Def. 3) and generally, it
cannot be measured in a one-shot manner using LOCC.
However, our goal is to estimate ǫz by measuring the
combined Γidealxtot , which is a sum of Γx over many diﬀerent
systems, and for this purpose, we can apply some other
8LOCC measurement, the method and the accuracy will
be given in the next paragraph. For the estimate of ǫx,
the twisted observable Γz = UABA′B′(σz⊗σz⊗I)U †ABA′B′
is simply σz ⊗ σz ⊗ IA′B′ because σz commutes with U
and U †. So, the original analysis of [4] holds, and mx
samples are used for this estimate. In step (3’) and (4’),
the computation basis measurement to obtain the sifted-
raw-key and the rest of the classical postprocessing all
commute with U⊗n†. Thus, we can ﬁnished the entire
QKD protocol before the untwisting, which then clearly
does nothing and can be omitted.
LOCC estimation of ǫz via product observables:






x by an LOCC measurement of product ob-
servables, such that the outcome statistics are similar.
We denote the probability distribution of the outcome of
measuring Γidealxtot by µideal, and that of the LOCC mea-
surement of product observables by µlocc.
We now explain the LOCC measurement that generates
µlocc. First, obtain a decomposition for the single system
observable Γx into product observables:





where {Oj}tj=1 is a basis (trace-orthonormal) for her-
mitian operators acting on AA′ and BB′, and t =
d2d′. Second, Alice and Bob divide their mz samples
into t2 groups. They use each group for one pair of
(ja, jb), and they obtain a measurement outcome de-




i=1 (OjaAA′⊗OjbBB′)(i). This is a sum of product
observables, and can be measured in LOCC as mentioned
before (Alice and Bob can individually measure OjaAA′
and OjbBB′ on the ith test system, multiply their re-
sults via LOCC, and ﬁnally sum those products over i =




OjbBB′ ] be the “outcome” of the LOCC estimation of
the phase error rate, deﬁning a distribution µlocc.
Is µlocc close to µideal that is generated by measuring
Γidealxtot directly? It will be if the entire mz sample systems
are in a joint tensor-power state, and if mz/t
2 is large
enough (because Chernoﬀ-like bounds will hold and be-
cause of Eq. (10)). However, in our current problem,
Alice and Bob share ?ρ which is not a tensor-power state.
Fortunately, ﬁrst, permutation symmetry can be imposed
in the protocol, and second, since the estimation involves
only a small portion (mz) of the entire n systems, the ex-
ponential quantum deFinetti theorem [6] states that the
measured (reduced) state is close to a mixture of “almost-
tensor-power-states” so that the Chernoﬀ-like bounds
will hold and the estimate will thus be accurate. The ex-
act analysis involves many adaptations of the results in
[6]. In the appendix, we prove a much more general theo-
rem (Theorem 3) for any observable O on one copy of the
bipartite Hilbert space in place of Γx, for any dimensions,






µlocc generated by the above LOCC procedure. We ob-
tain an upper bound for Pr(‖µideal − µlocc‖tr > δ) where
‖ · ‖tr denotes the trace distance.
Adapting Theorem 3, we write the symbol in the ap-
pendix on the left hand side of the arrow, and what it
should be in the current context on the right hand side.
We choose the parameters as d → d2d′, t → t2 = d4d′2,
n + 2m → n, m → mz, δ → δ/3, ‖Γx‖2HS = d2d′ (since
Γx is unitary). Then,

























where the three expressions in the upper bound respec-
tively come from the exponential quantum deFinetti the-
orem, the Chernoﬀ bound, and random sampling theory.
Furthermore, by the sampling theory Proposition 1 in
the Appendix, ǫx can also be estimated with mx samples




Putting these altogether, Pr(| ǫz,P − ǫz| ≥ δ or | ǫx,P −



























The composable security parameter will still be less than√
4f(δ,mx,mz) + β2b as derived in the summary of the
original Lo-Chau scheme.
Now, we state parameters that will make√
4f(δ,mx,mz) + β2b exponentially small in some
security parameter s. Note that βb is unaﬀected by
our modiﬁcation to the EC/PA-Lo-Chau scheme, and
we focus on the f(δ,mx,mz) portion. We choose some
security parameter s and make each term in Eq. (12)
exponentially small in s (≈ 2−s) by the following choices
(with each item corresponding to each term in order).
(1) Take sample size for bit-error rate to be mx = s× 16δ2 .
(2) Generally, since mz has to be small compared to n,
thus, r = 4s and r ≥ d4d′2 lnn.
(3) m′ := mz/t2 should be large (at least O(s)),
while r/m′ ≪ 1 and m′ ≫ logm′. In particular,
say, H(r/m′) ≤ δ2/(72t2d2d′) and m′δ2/(72t2d2d′) ≥
2d′d2 log(m′/2 + 1) and m′ ≥ s× 144t2d2d′/δ2 − 2 log t.
(4) m′ ≥ s× 72d′2d4/δ2 − log(d2d′).
Clearly, for s ranging from constant to linear in n, there
9are corresponding choices of r,mz ,mx that will work.
Roughly speaking, mx ≥ O(s/δ2) and mz ≥ O(log n)
will be the two asymptotic requirements when d, d′ are
ﬁxed.
With this analysis of the accuracy of the estimation, and
following from earlier discussion, the security proof for
the QKD protocol is completed.
III. PREPARE AND MEASURE SCHEME
In the previous section, we have provided a security proof
of the pbit-puriﬁcation-based QKD (PPP-QKD) proto-
cols in which the parties are processing an untrusted
shared state and are extracting a key from it. Typ-
ically, the processing requires quantum memory, and
some times, coherent operations on the quantum state.
As we have noted, entanglement-distillation-based proto-
col (EPP-QKD) are closely related to the much simpler
P/M-QKD. We will thus convert our PPP-QKD protocol
to a P/M-QKD scheme, adapting to pbits earlier works
based on ebits [3, 5, 22].
In PPP-QKD, the initial state is completely arbitrary.
In P/M-QKD, Alice ﬁrst prepares the state, and then
Eve attacks it. Thus, the state ?ρ is more restricted. In
particular, we focus on tensor power states prepared by
Alice – the most physically relevant case because of the
simplicity in implementation.
Since our protocol already have the distillation steps re-
placed by EC/PA, there are only 2 coherent steps to mod-
ify: (1) distribute ?ρ via an untrusted channel and (2) es-
timate ǫx, ǫz on the sample systems and measure the rest
in the computation basis to generate the sifted-raw-key.
We now dissect these two steps. In most of the useful
cases, in step (1), Alice only needs to prepare a ten-
sor power state ρ⊗n0 over the n bipartite systems and
send each of Bob’s halves via one use of the given un-
trusted channel N . They are expecting to share the
state (I ⊗ N (ρ0))⊗n while they are actually sharing
?ρ = (I⊗n⊗E(ρ⊗n0 )) for an arbitrary joint attack E by Eve.
For step (2), recall that it suﬃces to perform measure-
ments of product observables on individual system. Now,
focus on such a measurement of some Oa ⊗Ob on one of
these systems. Let {|ψl〉}l be a complete set of eigenvec-
tors of Oa. Note that Alice’s measurement on each of her
halves of the state commutes with the transmission via
the channel and Bob’s measurement. So, she can mea-
sure ﬁrst, before sending each of Bob’s halves, without
aﬀecting the security. It means that she sends the state
trAA′ [(|ψl〉〈ψl|AA′⊗IBB′) ρ0AA′BB′ ] (unnormalized) with
probability which is the trace of that state, followed by a
measurement of Ob by Bob. Thus, a conversion to P/M-
QKD can be obtained, with a caveat.
The problem is that in puriﬁcation-based QKD, each pair
of local measurements for each system is chosen prob-
abilistically (from Eve’s point of view) and with per-
fect coordination between Alice and Bob. When con-
verting to P/M-QKD, various naive options fail or come
with extra requirements: (a) If Alice announces her mea-
surement before Bob signals receipt of the states, Eve
could have intercepted the transmitted state, performed
Bob’s measurement, resent the postmeasurement state
to Bob, and completely evaded detection. (b) If Alice
waits until Bob signals receipt of the states, before an-
nouncing her basis, and then Bob makes his measure-
ments, he will need quantum memory to hold his received
states. (c) If Alice’s bases annnouncement is encrypted
with a private key, it has to be roughly O(mz logn) =
O(s polylog(n)/δ2) where s is the security parameter of
the QKD protocol (which can range from constant to lin-
ear in n). In comparison, an initial key is also required
for the authentication of some of the classical messages.
It is an open problem what is the minimum authentica-
tion requirement. If one authenticates all of the bases
information, the identity of the states in the test samples
for parameter estimation, and forward communication in
EC/PA, it will take O(log n) key bits. Thus, for high se-
curity parameter requiring mz to be growing with n, en-
cryption of the bases information qualitatively increases
the the amount of the initial key required.
The initial solution in BB84 was to have Bob guessing
the measurement basis, and postselect those with prop-
erly matched measurement basis. The price is a lower
key rate. The method was improved on by [5] so as to
preserve the key rate asymptotically. We will adapt this
technique in our protocol.
The idea in [5] is that, even though randomness in the
measurement basis is necessary for security, only a small
fraction needs to diﬀer from the computational basis to
have suﬃcient conﬁdence in the estimates of ǫx, ǫz –
something we have already exploited in the PPP-QKD
scheme in the previous section. Here, Alice and Bob
will independently pick a large enough fraction O(nc)
of the n systems to be measured for each Oj (the or-
thonormal basis for operators acting on each of the local
systems AA′ and BB′), and with high probability, for
each pair (ja, jb), the observable Oja ⊗ Ojb would have
been applied to a fraction O(n2c−2) of all systems, giv-
ing O(n2c−1) samples. Remember the requirement mz ≥
s polylog(n)/δ2, so that nc ≥ √snpolylog(n)/δ will pro-
vide suﬃcient overlap for calculcating 〈OjaAA′ ⊗OjbBB′〉
and subsequently ǫz. For the protocol in the previous sec-
tion, the local dimensions are d
√
d′ and each of Alice and
Bob have t = d2d′ − 1 traceless observables to measure
locally. Thus O(tnc) systems will be used for estimating
ǫz and the rest can all be measured in the computation
basis (for estimating ǫx and for the (unsifted) raw-key
generation). Finally, by the procedure to turn a measure-
ment of Alice and ρ0 into an ensemble of signal states,
the conversion to a P/M-QKD is completed.
We note that the above procedure can be suboptimal,
especially if t is large. For example, if the decomposition
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of the single system observable Γx has low Schmidt rank
t′ ≪ t2 in the Hilbert-Schmidt decomposition, then, ef-
fectively, only t′ local observables have to be measured.
Also, data from unmatching bases can be potentially use-
ful, and currently, they are discarded for simplicity of the
argument. These, and other optimization, are issues for
future research.
IV. A CHANNEL WITH ZERO QUANTUM
CAPACITY AND NONZERO KEY RATE
Recall that there are key distillable but bound entangled
states [1, 17, 34]. Using results in the current paper, they
can be veriﬁed and therefore can have nonzero rates of
generating unconditionally secure key. Based on one of
these states, we construct a channel that has zero quan-
tum capacity and nonzero key rate.
For ρ0, choose a state ρH from [34] that has a maximally
mixed reduced state on AA′. Thus it can be written as
ρH = (IAA′ ⊗ NBB′)(ΦdAB ⊗ Φd′A′B′) for some chan-
nel NBB′ . ρH is PPT (having positive partial transpose
[19]) and is thus bound entangled. On the other hand,
if veriﬁed, ρH has nonzero key rate. Since ρH is bound
entangled if and only if N is entanglement binding (with
zero rate to create entanglement for any unentangled in-
put) ([35]), N has zero quantum capacity. Finally, in the
absence of eavesdropping, Alice and Bob can distribute
copies of ρH , verify them, and generate a key. Thus N
provides the example we are seeking.
We now deﬁne the state ρH . Recall that for a pure state
|ψ〉, we use the shorthand ψ for the density matrix |ψ〉〈ψ|.
Deﬁne the four Bell states as
|ψ0,1〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉) (13)
|ψ2,3〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |01〉) (14)












Then, for κ a small parameter to be deﬁned later, take
ρH = (1 − κ)
∑
i
qiψiAB ⊗ ρ(i)A′B′ + κ I16 (16)
where q0 = q1 =
p


















, and κ = 0, ρH = ρ
T2
H where T2 denotes
the partial transpose of the second system. When κ is
nonzero (but can be very small) there is a corresponding
neighborhood of p for which ρH is PPT and thus bound
entangled. Here, we claim that there is an untwisting
operation of the form given by Eq. (2) that we can apply
to ρH , so that further tracing of A
′B′ will give us the
state
σAB = (1− κ)
(
pψ0 + (1− p)ψ2
)
+ κ I4 . (18)
Note that the transformation of the κ term is straight-
forward and also κ → 0, so, we can focus on the (1 − κ)
term. Let V1 be any unitary that transforms the follow-
ing states as:
|00〉 → |00〉 , |11〉 → |11〉 , |ψ2〉 → |01〉 , |ψ3〉 → |10〉 (19)
and V2 transforms |χ+,−〉 to |00〉, |11〉 respectively. V1,2
exist, because they preserve orthonormality of the input
space. Then, the untwisting operation can be deﬁned as:
UH =
(|11〉〈11|AB ⊗ σzA′ ⊗ IB′)×(
(|00〉〈00|+ |11〉〈11|)AB ⊗ V1A′B′
+(|01〉〈01|+ |10〉〈10|)AB ⊗ V2A′B′
)
(20)
This is because the right hand factor ﬁrst transforms
the ρ
(0,1,2,3)
A′B′ component in ρH to
1
2 (|00〉〈00| + |01〉〈01|),
1
2 (|11〉〈11| + |10〉〈10|), |00〉〈00|, and |11〉〈11|, respec-
tively, and the subsequent left hand factor (eﬀectively
a controlled-σz from A
′ to A) turns ψ1,3 into ψ0,2 respec-
tively. This proves the assertion that the untwisted state
is given by Eq. (18). For very small κ and p > 1/2 (we
have taken p ≈ 0.5858), EPP can distill a key from σAB
at a rate 1−H(0.5858)≈ 0.0213, thus there exists corre-
sponding EC/PA procedure to generate a key from our
protocol. This completes the proof that N is a untrusted
channel that is entanglement binding but with nonzero
key rate.
As a side remark, the ﬁrst term of ρH represents as mix-
ture of two pbits with a common twisting operation (no
constraint on ancillary state) but diﬀering by a bit-ﬂip of
the underlying ebit. EPP on these mixtures are particu-
larly simple.
Let us understand this channel N in more operational
terms. Recall that a channel is completely determined
by the state I ⊗ N (Φd) where d is the input dimension
of N . Thus, any correct way to transform ΦAB ⊗ ΦA′B′
to ρH via operations on BB
′ will be a valid description
of how N acts. Thus consider the following sequence of
operations:
(1) With probability p/2, measured B′ in the compu-
tation basis. (a) If outcome is |0〉, do nothing. (b) If
outcome is |1〉, apply σz to B.
(2) With probability p/4, apply σzB ⊗ σyB′ .
(3) With probability p/4, apply σxB′ .





























(a) If the outcome is “0”, apply σxB. (b) If the outcome
is “1”, apply σyB ⊗ σzB′ .
It is immediate that cases (1a), (1b), (2), (3), (4a), and
(4b) give post-measurement states (systems labeled by
ABA′B′): ψ0⊗ |00〉〈00|, ψ1⊗ |11〉〈11|, ψ1⊗ψ3, ψ0⊗ψ2,
ψ2⊗χ+, and ψ3⊗χ−, respectively. Also, both measure-
ments yield equiprobable outcomes. Thus, the probabili-
ties for all these cases are p/4, p/4, p/4, p/4, (1−p)/2, (1−
p)/2. Mixing up the states from all the cases gives exactly
the (1 − κ) term of ρH . To incorporate the negligible κ
term, we can take convex combination of the above with
the completely randomizing channel on BB′. While the
bit and phase error rates are tricky to deﬁne, any simple
attempt will yield amusingly high numbers.
Finally, we can use the recipe in Sec. III to obtain a cor-
responding P/M-QKD scheme. The initial state ρ0 in
this case is ΦAB ⊗ ΦA′B′ . For the estimation of ǫz, Al-
ice will measure product Pauli operators on AA′ because
they form the desired orthonormal basis for traceless ob-
servables. The actual states transmitted are exactly the
equiprobable ensemble of the six eigenstates of σx,y,z on
each of B and B′ for the O(
√
ns) test systems. The rest
of the systems are prepared in random states in the com-
putation basis. Likewise, Bob measures O(
√
ns) systems
in the eigenbases of σx,y,z and the rest in computation
basis. Note that the ensemble of states sent and the mea-
surements on Bob’s side are exactly those of the eﬃcient
version of the six-state protocol. Here, a completely dif-
ferent interpretation via pbits yields drastically diﬀerent
results (the key rate will be zero otherwise).
V. OPTIMAL UNTWISTING
In our QKD protocol (both the puriﬁcation-based and
the P/M variant), the key rate is determined by the esti-
mated ǫx, ǫz, and once these are measured, we optimize
over the EPP or the EC/PA procedure.
Consider, for each U , the PPP-QKD scheme again.
Given ?ρ, we want to ﬁnd ǫx, ǫz such that
?ρ ∈ Sǫ =
{U⊗n(Pǫ(ΦAB)⊗ ρ⊗nA′B′)U †⊗n} and generally, such ǫx, ǫz
will depend on U . As long as ?ρ ∈ Sǫ for some U , ǫ is a
legitimate estimate and EPP will produce a secure key of
appropriate length. (Untwisting only occurs in our inter-
pretation of the sampled data.) To exploit this feature,
note that more precisely, ǫx is independent of twisting,
but ǫz is not. Thus, for a list of possible twisting op-
erators Ui, Alice and Bob should estimate each of the
corresponding twisted phase error rate ǫzi and take the
minimal one to optimize the key rate extractable in EPP.
At a ﬁrst glance, they will need to measure Γidealxtot for each
Ui. But recall that each twisted phase error is derived
from the decomposition given by Eq. (10) and from es-
timating the product observables in the decomposition.
For diﬀerent Ui, the same set of product observables are
measured, and the detail on Ui only enters the QKD pro-
tocol in the coeﬃcients in the decomposition Eq. (10),
and thus, the same set of product observables can be
used to calculate all possible ǫzi, and the optimization
over twisting operator is an entirely classical computa-
tion problem.
Similar analysis holds for P/M-QKD. Just like PPP-
QKD, the choice of Ui only enters the protocol via the
classical computation of the estimate ǫzi. Thus, Alice
and Bob runs the protocol as stated before, but now with
extra minimization of ǫzi over all possible Ui in their clas-
sical computation, followed by the appriopriate EC/PA
procedure.
VI. DISCUSSION
We have seen that for any channel which allows for the
distribution of key distillable states, there exists a pro-
tocol for verifying security. The protocol is related to
the scheme of Lo and Chau, the diﬀerence being that
phase errors become twisted phase errors, and are mea-
sured by decomposing this operator in terms of product
observables. Accuracy of this procedure is due to the ex-
ponential quantum deFinetti theorem [6] and the usual
Chernoﬀ bound and sampling theory. Security of this
protocol was proven by reduction to the Lo-Chau proof
of security. We then converted it to a prepare and mea-
sure scheme which has the advantage of not requiring
quantum coherent control. Furthermore, one can classi-
cally optimize over the twisting operation to minimize the
corresponding twisted phsae error rate, and thus maxi-
mizing the key rate possible. More generally, each ebit-
based QKD protocol that involves parameter estimation
on small fraction of sample systems, and otherwise in-
volves only computation basis measurement and classical
processing of the data has an analogue based on pbits.
Paradoxically, though the heart of the security proof re-
lates to entanglement puriﬁcation, it never needs to be
done in the actual protocol, nor is noiseless entanglement
needed in our scheme. In particular, our protocol can
be based on bound entangled states or binding entangle-
ment channels with zero entanglement rate or quantum
capacity.
This demonstrates conceptually that quantum key distri-
bution is not equivalent to the ability to send quantum
information. In some way, it means the ability to perform
error correction on any logical space is unnecessary.
We have noted that some of the states or measurement
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results are not used in the analysis. Further research will
exploit such data to improve on the key rate.
It will also be interesting to study the alternative protocol
based on state tomography discussed in Sec. ID and [1]
and investigate possible advantages (such as that on the
key rate).
A big open question is whether all entangled states can be
converted via LOCC to pbits, and related to this question
is whether all binding entanglement channels can be used
for QKD.
Finally, our protocol is restricted to some classes of twist-
ing (e.g., tensor power twisting). It will be interesting to
either show the possibility of QKD in the case of com-
pletely arbitrary twisting or to obtain a no-go theorem.
APPENDIX A: LOCC ESTIMATION OF THE
EXPECTATION OF AN IID OBSERVABLE
1. Finite quantum de Finetti theorem and
generalized Chernoff bound
We say that a state ρn on Hilbert space H⊗n satisﬁes the
Chernoﬀ bound with respect to a state σ onH and a mea-
surementM onH if (with high probability) the frequency
distribution obtained by measuring M⊗n on ρn is close
to that of measuring M on σ. For example, ρn = σ⊗n.
However many other states satisfy the same property. An
important class is called almost power states, which are
formulated and studied in [6]. We adapt results in [6] for
our own purpose in the following.
Theorem 1 (Finite quantum de Finetti theorem
plus Chernoff bound) Consider any permutationally
invariant (possibly mixed) state ρn+k on Hilbert space
H⊗(n+k). Let ρn = Trkρn+k be the partial trace of ρn+k
over k systems. Then there exists a probability measure











≤ 2 e− k(r+1)2(n+k)+ 12 dim(H)2 ln k (A1)
2. The states ρ
(σ)
n,r (called almost power states) satisfy
the Chernoff bound in the following sense
Pr





4 −h( rn )
i
+|W | log(n2 +1) =: e(δ) (A2)
where M={Mw}w∈W is any measurement on H,
PM(σ) = {Tr(σMw)}w, QM(ρ(σ)n,r) is the frequency
distribution obtained from measuring M⊗n on the
state ρ
(σ)
n,r, and |W | is the size of the alphabet W .
3. Reduced density matrices of the states ρ
(σ)
n,r (to n′ ≤












where r ≤ n′/2 and ρ(σ)n,r,n′ = Trn−n′ρ(σ)n,r is the par-
tial trace of ρ
(σ)
n,r over n− n′ systems.
Proof: We ﬁrst collect various facts, deﬁnitions, and re-
sults from [6].
a. Fact and definitions
Definition 4 Almost power state: (Def. 4.1.4, in
[6]) Suppose 0 ≤ r ≤ n. Let Sym(H⊗n) denote the
symmetric subspace of pure states of Hilbert space H⊗n.
Let |θ〉 ∈ H be an arbitrary pure state and consider:
V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗n−r) := {π(|θ〉⊗n−r ⊗ |ψr〉) : π ∈ Sn,
|ψr〉 ∈ H⊗r}
where Sn is the permutation group of the n systems. We
define the almost power states along |θ〉 to be the set of
pure states in
|θ〉[⊗,n,r] := Sym(H⊗n) ∩ span(V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗n−r)) (A4)
We denote the set of mixtures of almost tensor power
states along |θ〉 as conv(|θ〉[⊗,n,r]).
With the above deﬁnition, we shall prove the following
lemma:
Lemma 1 If ̺n ∈ conv(|θ〉[⊗,n,r]), then, ̺n−m ∈
conv(|θ〉[⊗,n−m,r]) where ̺n−m = Trm(̺n) is the reduced
density matrix after the partial trace over any m out of
the n systems (by symmetry, without loss of generality,
we take the first m systems).
Proof .-
Since membership in conv(|θ〉[⊗,n−m,r]) is preserved un-
der mixing, it suﬃces to prove the lemma for pure
̺n = |Ψ〉〈Ψ|, with |Ψ〉 ∈ |θ〉[⊗,n,r].
We can pick an ensemble realizing ̺n−m of our choice,
and prove the lemma by showing that any element
|Ψn−m〉 in that ensemble belongs to |θ〉[⊗,n−m,r]. Our
ensemble is obtained by an explicit partial trace of |Ψn〉
over the ﬁrst m subsystems along the computational ba-
sis. An element is given by
|Ψn−m〉 = 〈i1|...〈im| ⊗ In−m|Ψn〉. (A5)
Now, we note two facts:
(i) |Ψn−m〉 ∈ Sym(H⊗(n−m)) – This is because |Ψn〉 ∈
Sym(H⊗(n)) = span(|φ〉⊗n).
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(ii) |Ψn−m〉 ∈ V(H⊗n−m, |θ〉⊗(n−m−r)) – This is because
|Ψn〉 ∈ V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗n−r), and expressing |Ψn〉 in terms
of the spanning vectors of V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗n−r) and putting




αΨr ,π〈i1| · · · 〈im|⊗In−m π (|θ〉⊗n−r⊗|Ψr〉).
Elementary analysis shows that any term of the
above sum is, up to permutation, of the form
(〈i1|θ〉) · · · (〈ip|θ〉)|θ〉⊗n−r−p ⊗ [〈ip+1| · · · 〈im| ⊗
Ir−(m−p) π′(|Ψr〉)] where 0 ≤ p ≤ m, and “ab-
sorbing” m− p copies of θ to the last part of the vector,
we get |θ〉⊗n−(r+m) ⊗ |Ψ′′r 〉. Thus, |Ψm−n〉 is a sum of
terms of the form π(|θ〉⊗n−(r+m)⊗ |Ψ′′r 〉), and belongs to
V(H⊗(n−m), |θ〉⊗n−(r+m)). This proves the second fact,
and also the lemma. 
Property of a mixture of almost tensor power states
behaves approximately like a mixture of tensor power
states, so that the generalized version of Chernoﬀ bound
holds.
Lemma 2 (Theorem 4.5.2 of [6]) Let M =
{Mw}w∈W be a POVM on H, let 0 ≤ r ≤ n2 . More-
over let |θ〉 ∈ H and let |Ψn〉 be a vector from |θ〉[⊗,n,r].
There holds:





4 −h( rn )
i
+|W | log(n2 +1) =: e(δ)
where PM(|θ〉〈θ|) = {Tr|θ〉〈θ|Mw}w and PM[|Ψn〉〈Ψn|]
is the frequency distribution of outcomes of M⊗n applied
to |Ψn〉〈Ψn|, and the probability is taken over those out-
comes. Note that we have used e(δ) instead of δ(e) in [6].
Consider the general probability Pr(‖PM(ρ)−PM[̺n]‖ <
δ) where PM[̺n] is a frequency distribution of outcomes
of M⊗n applied to |Ψn〉〈Ψn|. The distribution PM[̺n],
if treated as a functional of ̺n on the spaceH⊗n, is linear
in ̺n. Following this we get immediately:
Corollary 1 Lemma 2 holds when replacing the pro-
jector |Ψn〉〈Ψn| (for |Ψn〉 ∈ |θ〉[⊗,n,r]) by ̺n ∈
conv(|θ〉[⊗,n,r]).
Apart form the generalised Chernoﬀ-type lemmas, we
also need the crucial exponential quantum ﬁnite de-
Finetti theorem:
Theorem 2 (Theorem 4.3.2 of [6]) For any pure
state |ψn+k〉 ∈ Sym(H⊗n+k) and 0 ≤ r ≤ n there exists
a measure dν(|θ〉) on H and for each |θ〉 ∈ H a pure






≤ 2e− k(r+1)2(n+k)+ 12 dim(H) ln k (A6)
Finally, we need the fact that any permutationally in-
variant state has a symmetric puriﬁcation.
Lemma 3 (Lemma 4.2.2 of [6]) Let ρn be permuta-
tionally invariant state on H. Then there exists purifica-
tion of the state on Sym((H⊗H)⊗n)
This concludes the list of facts and deﬁnitions needed for
proving Theorem 1.
b. Proof of Theorem 1
Consider an arbitrary permutationally invariant state
̺n+k on Hilbert space H⊗(n+k).
Step (1): According to Lemma 3 there is a puriﬁcation
|ψn+k〉 that belongs to Sym(H′⊗n+k) where H′ = H⊗H˜
and dim(H˜) =dim(H).
Step (2): We apply to ψn+k theorem 2 with the changes
H → H′ = H⊗ H˜
d → d2 (A7)
Step (3): After application of theorem 2 we perform par-
tial trace over H˜⊗n, the purifying spaces introduced in
(1). We denote this partial trace by T˜r. This partial
trace induces from the measure on H′ in step (2) the new
measure µ(σ) on the set of all mixed states σ deﬁned on
H. (This is deﬁned by probability ascribed by the mea-
sure µ to the subset of H′ equal to the equivalence class
of all pure states |θ〉 which satisfy T˜r(|θ〉〈θ|) = σ). This





n,r ≡ T˜r(|ψ(θ)n 〉〈ψ(θ)n |) where the existence of the pure
states |ψ(θ)n 〉 is guaranteed by theorem 2. Finally we note
that partial trace does not increase the trace distance be-
tween two quantum states, so applying partial trace to
the LHS of (A6) and using the notation described above
we get immediately the inequality (A1). This proves the
ﬁrst item of Theorem (1).
To prove the second item of Theorem (1), remember from
the above that ρ
(σ)
n,r ≡ T˜r(|ψ(θ)n 〉〈ψ(θ)n |). Since |ψ(θ)n 〉 is an
almost power pure state, lemma 2 applies. Further, it
holds for all POVM-s on H′ = H⊗ H˜, and in particular
for incomplete POVM-s acting only on H but not on H˜.
Thus, the conclusion of lemma 2 holds with the change:
M→M⊗ I, which gives item (2).
Finally, to prove item 3 of theorem 1, note that the re-
duced density matrices ̺σn,r,n′ of interest can be obtained
from the pure state |ψ(θ)n 〉 above by tracing (i) ﬁrst over
n−n′ subsystems corresponding to H′, producing a state
on H′⊗n′ , and (ii) then over n′ subsystems corresponding
to H˜.
Then lemma 1 guarantees that the ﬁrst partial trace
produces a mixed state ̺n′ in conv(|θ〉[⊗,n′,n′−r]) (with
14
underlying space H′. Applying corollary 1 to ̺n′ with
n′ instead of n, it suﬃces to consider a pure state in
|θ〉[⊗,n′,n′−r]. Finally, lemma 2 can be applied to this
pure state with M → M ⊗ I which concludes item 3
(with the assumption 0 ≤ r ≤ n′2 ). 
2. Two other useful results
a. Classical random sampling
In addition to the fact and deﬁnitions above and Theorem
1, we will need the following result on classical random
sampling (or equivalently symmetric probability distri-
bution).
Proposition 1 (Classical sampling theory)
Lemma A.4 from [36]. Let Z be an n-tuple and
Z ′ a k-tuple of random variables over set Z, with
symmetric joint probability P . Let Qz′ be a frequency
distribution of a fixed sequence z′ and Q(z,z′) be frequency
distribution of a sequence (z, z′). Then for every ǫ ≥ 0
we have
P (||Q(z,z′) −Qz′ || ≥ ǫ) ≤ |Z|e−kǫ
2/8|Z|. (A8)
The result says that frequency obtained from a small
sample is close to frequency distribution obtained from
the whole system.
b. From probabilities to averages
Lemma 4 Consider an observable L on Hilbert space
H, dimH = d. Let L = ∑ti=1 siLi, where Li satisfy
TrLiL
†
j = δij . Let eigenvalues of Li be denoted by λ
(i)
l .
Consider arbitrary state ρ, and let P (i) = {p(i)l } be the
probability distribution on l (which eigenvalue) induced
by measuring Li on ρ. Let Q
(i) = {q(i)l } be an arbitrary















||P (i) −Q(i)||, (A9)
where ‖ · ‖HS is the Hilbert-Schmidt norm, ‖ · ‖∞ is the

























































which ends the proof. 
3. Estimation - detailed description
We consider 2m + n systems with Hilbert space
H⊗(2m+n), dimH = d in a permutationally invariant
state ̺2m+n. Suppose the ultimate goal is to obtain the
“frequency mean-value” of some single-system observable





(j) where Σ(j) = I ⊗ I ⊗ · · · ⊗ Σ ⊗ · · · ⊗ I on
the N subsystems for N = n+m.
Because of experimental limitations (here, it is the LOCC
constraints on Alice and Bob), they are restricted to mea-
suring product operators of the form L = LA ⊗ LB by
independently ﬁnding the eigenvalues of LA and LB (i.e.,
making the measurements LA⊗I and I⊗LB), discussing
over classical channels and multiplying their outcomes
together. Now, to measure Σ, one can ﬁrst rewrite it in





where we have chosen {Li} to be hermitian and trace
orthonormal, so that si are real. The Li-s are “interme-
diate observables.” We will describe an inference scheme
that (1) involves only the estimation of the “frequency
mean-value” of Σ on a small number (m) of subsystems,
and (2) the measurement of Σ is done indirectly via mea-
surements of the Li’s.
The analysis will start with special assumption about
the 2m-element sample, m of which are used for indirect
estimation. The assumptions are relaxed on that sample.
After that properties of the other m+ n subsystems are
inferred.
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Suppose the ﬁrst 2m subsystems are in a joint state ̺
(σ)
2m,r,
with r ≤ 12×2m. We expect the state ̺(σ)2m,r to play a role
similar to the state σ⊗2m. Deﬁne the theoretical direct
average




We will show that the empirical average, either obtained
directly or indirectly, will be close to the above.
For the indirect measurement, divide the ﬁrst m subsys-
tems into t groups. Each group has m′ = m/t subsys-
tems. Alice and Bob take the ith group (i = 1, · · · , t)
and measure Li on each site as described above (the
measurement is Li). In other words, the measurement
M indirect = ⊗ti=1(L⊗m
′
i ) is applied to the ﬁrst m subsys-
tems of the entire 2m+ n subsystems. The reduction of
the state ̺
(σ)
2m,r to the ﬁrst m subsystems induces proba-
bility distribution P on the outcomes of M indirect.
Since we expect ̺
(σ)
2m,r and σ
⊗m to behave similarly, con-







l induced by the state σ as follows:
Pi = {Tr(σP l)}l (A14)
An execution of the measurement L⊗m′i gives a particular
outcome (l1, ..., lm′) and induces frequency distribution
Qi on alphabet Ai of the observable Li.
Then, the empirical frequency distributions Qi is close to
the “theoretical” distribution Pi:
Fact 1
P(‖Pi −Qi‖ ≥ δ) ≤ e(δ,m′, r, d), (A15)
where d is the dimension of the single site Hilbert space,
and
e(δ, n, r, |Z|) := 2−( δ
2
4 −H( rn ))n+|Z| log(n2+1) (A16)
Proof - Follows immediately from the third item of Theo-
rem 1. Note that we use item (3) not (2) since we perform
the measurement only on part of the state ̺
(σ)
2m,r.
Remark - Note also that Pi is constant while Qi is a
random variable.
Now, we deﬁne the theoretical average values for the in-
termediate observables Li’s:
〈Li〉σ = Tr(Liσ) (A17)







where Qi(l) denotes value of Qi on speciﬁc event l from
alphabet Ai. (Again, 〈Li〉σ is constant while 〈Li〉emp is
a random variable depending on the particular outcomes







again, recall that we the empirical value of Σ obtained





We now show that the indirect empirical average is close
to the direct theoretical average in Eq. (A13). First ap-
plying the union bound to Fact 1, we get
P(∪i=1,...,t{||Pi −Qi|| > δ}) ≤ t · e(δ,m′, r, d) (A20)
Then using Lemma 4 we obtain that P (|∑ti si〈Li〉σ −∑t
i si〈Li〉emp| > δ) ≤ t ·e( δ||Σ||HS√t ,m
′, r, d) which is just







After considering the indirect measurements, suppose




on the second group of m subsystems. The empirical





where Q is the frequency distribution on the alphabet
of Σ (similarly as Qi is the frequency distribution of al-
phabet Ai of Li), and γx are some real numbers. In a
way similar to the indirect case (but much easier here)
we show that the empirical direct average is close to
Eq. (A13):
P(|〈Σ〉σ − 〈Σ〉(m)emp| > δ) ≤ e(
δ
||Σ||HS ,m, r, d). (A23)
From the inequalities (A21), (A23) we obtain
Lemma 5 For the measurements on the state ̺
(σ)
2m,r con-
sidered above we have:
P(|〈Σ〉(m)emp − 〈〈Σ〉〉(m)emp| > 2δ)
≤ t · e( δ||Σ||HS
√
t
,m′, r, d) + e(
δ
||Σ||HS ,m, r, d)
≤ (t+ 1)e( δ||Σ||HS
√
t
,m′, r, d) (A24)
Proof .- Here triangle inequality and union bound to in-
equalities (A21), (A23) suﬃces together with the prop-
erties of e(δ, n, r, d).
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b. Passing from ̺
(σ)
2m,r-s to their integrals and then to a
close-by state
Note that both integration and the measurement of a
state to produce the classical distribution of the outcomes
are both linear, completely positive, and trace-preserving












2m,rdµ(σ)|| ≤ ǫ (A25)
and since the trace distance is nonincreasing under the
measurement (a TCP map), the output distribution is
diﬀerent by no more than ǫ. In this way we have proven





2m,rdµ(σ)|| ≤ ǫ we have
P ′(|〈Σ〉(m)emp − 〈〈Σ〉〉(m)emp| > 2δ)
≤ (t+ 1)e( δ||Σ||HS
√
t
,m′, r, d) + ǫ. (A26)
where P ′ is the probability distribution on outcomes of
measurement L⊗m′1 ⊗ ... ⊗ L⊗m
′
t ⊗M⊗m induced by the
state ̺2m.
c. Inferring direct average on n+m samples of general
state ̺2m+n from indirect measurements on m samples
Now we pass to the general permutationally invariant
state ̺2m+n. We have the following:
Theorem 3 Consider permutationally invariant state
̺2m+n on H⊗2m+n and dimH = d. On this state we
perform the measurement L⊗m′1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ L⊗m
′
t ⊗M⊗m+n
which induces the probability measure P ′′. (Note that P ′
is simply the marginal of P ′′.) Then we have






















where || · ||HS is the Hilbert-Schmidt norm.
Proof - The parameters e1,e2, e3 come from generalised
quantum de Finetti theorem, Chernoﬀ bound and sam-
pling proposition respectively.
To start with the proof note that from Theorem 1, item
1 we get that for ̺2m = Trn̺2m+n we have ||̺2m −∫
̺
(σ)
2m,rdµ(σ)|| ≤ ǫ with ǫ = e1. Applying then Lemma 6
we get that
P ′(|〈Σ〉(m)emp − 〈〈Σ〉〉(m)emp| > 2δ) ≤ e1 + e2 (A31)
Now we need to connect 〈〈Σ〉〉(m)emp with 〈Σ〉(m+n)emp . For
this we need sampling Proposition 1 P ′′(||QmΣ −Qm+nΣ || >
δ) ≤ de−mδ2/8d where Qmσ is the frequency distribution
on outputs of M induced by the state ρm (partial trace
of ρ2m+n over m + n systems and Q
m+n
σ is frequency
distribution induced on outcomes of M by state ρm+n
(partial trace of ρ2m+n over m systems) and d is the
dimension of elementary Hilbert space H (thus ̺2m is
deﬁned on H⊗2m. Using Lemma 4 we go to the averages
P ′′(|〈Σ〉(m)emp − 〈Σ〉(m+n)emp | > 3δ) ≤ e3. (A32)
Applying the union bound to Eqs. (A31) and (A32) we
get ﬁnally the statement of the theorem.
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